Types of Routing Protocols - The Ultimate Guide (The ...

FAQ: What exactly is the fraud in Ethereum?

Most important above all else, Ethereum has never been decentralized since its distribution (i.e. premine) & thus value of incentives depend entirely on 1 trusted party, the exact opposite of decentralization or trust minimization [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Calling themselves decentralized is literally deception of others for profit, which is by the most standard definitions called fraud.
Below is an example of how this centralization manifests and the absolute lack of ethics & types of other fraud behind Ethereum:
Historic account of bailout, fraud, and centralization: how Ethereum Foundation demonstrated to have full control over the ethereum blockchain beyond reasonable doubt while advertising falsely for profit
Point by point summary (sources cited below):
  1. Ethereum Foundation (EF) sell centrally pre-mined/pre-made Eth coins in ICO for centralized funding/profit while advertising "unstoppable .. exactly as programmed" code (regular cryptocurrencies are 0% premined, EF had 72m coins premined on day 0 which is ~70% of current supply)
  2. Slock.it developers including eth co-founder create an app called DAO on it for the purposes of funding themselves even more with claims that their "code sets the terms and conditions" like no one has done before them for even more money.
  3. DAO code has a mistake and starts giving away money to a user, vocal fraction of community is divided whether to bailout DAO investors, many unofficial polls show conflicting results with extremely low participation making it unclear whether the super majority is even aware or cares about this 3rd party issue.
  4. EF members refuse to disclose if they are invested in the DAO after promoting it, and many are later found to have been invested in it.
  5. EF tells exchanges there will not be a minority chain surviving, ignoring the divided community, and making it impossible to sell no-bailout version
  6. EF makes the carbonvote the "official" vote 12 hours before the release of the client--after repeatedly claiming for weeks it had no official capacity, and after already having made support for the fork the default option in the codebase. The vote only shows 4% of possible consensus supporting bailout, 1/4 of it from one vote.
  7. Most automated nodes and miners that run "apt-get upgrade && apt-get update" switch over even if haven't seen the announcement 12 hours prior and fork is declared a success.
  8. No-bailout chain survives regardless despite Foundation's efforts, but Ethereum Foundation refuses to update it even if it increases in popularity or size.
  9. Ethereum projects are forced to choose between developed chain with ICO funding, bailout, roadmap and one with no funding, no clear devs, no roadmap. Most are forced to stay with Ethereum Foundation holding central ICO funding & updates hostage.
  10. EF sells the unsold premined coins they still own on the no-bailout chain (forked premine), thus damaging its value
  11. EF members participate in White Hat Group (WHG), use same method used to drain DAO to drain no-bailout chain DAO and then market sell no bail-out ether on the exchanges damaging no-bailout chain value further
  12. EF changed the properties of the security it sold and still falsely advertises "unstoppable .. exactly as written" code (despite proving it false) while profiting from all of it.
Almost all the above actions are fraud.
Details and sources:
Top left of the banner shows marked up graphic [1] of ethereum.org claims including
"decentralized platform that runs smart contracts exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud".
Additionally, the third party app "the DAO" also re-iterated in their contract the similar premise that their code IS the terms and conditions [1,2]. Both DAO and Eth were sold advertised as such in their initial phases.
However, the DAO was programmed in a poorly done manner [1] and allowed loss of the investments put into it [2]. It was no secret members of the Ethereum Foundation (EF) were connected to the DAO often promoting it. Many were found to be invested in the DAO as time passed [1,2,3] , yet refused to disclose it when asked directly [4,5,6]. Despite the loss due to DAO contract being an issue of only minority of users, virtually all mentioned advertised properties of ethereum and the DAO were changed by the Ethereum Foundation to manually reverse the operations the smart contract ran while profiting from it.
How did they do it? By exploiting and proving centralization
Several centralized aspects of Ethereum were used to achieve this result:
  1. EF controls the defaults settings in codebase to get what they want. Only 12 hours before before the release of the client they selected carbonvote the "official" vote out of many varying options (after repeatedly claiming for weeks it had no official capacity, and after already having made support for the fork the default option in the codebase). This selected poll had many issues discussed below including 96% of possible votes not showing support for EF/DAO bailout. However the 4% vote with quarter from single vote with only hours of official notice before were used as justification anyway for bailout as default setting [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. By controlling the defaults, they easily took advantage of anyone not up to date on announcement hours earlier who automatically updated and/or the apathetic users to control the blockchain. By moving focus from what's best for majority via opt-in consensus (blockchain standard) to giving only a short window to opt-out, they can centrally manipulate the blockchain in almost any manner without enraging the majority into action [1,2]. As expected, the fork was quickly declared a success [1,2,3]. Control over codebase also allowed them to compromise those opting out by leaving them open to replay attacks, thus further damaging their value as can be seen celebrated by DAO and Eth cofounder Stephan Tual [1]. Effectively, this was equivalent to a successful 4% attack on a blockhain or even attack by a single centralized entity (EF). The approach is easily repeatable and exact opposite of expected censorship resistance against <50% attacks, thus proving it unsecure.
  2. EF has complete centralized ownership of the funds from 70% premine in form of eth and ICO BTC raised [1]. This made them the only well funded core developers and thus the only choice for rapid development and fully in control of what gets updated. By choosing to address this third party contract issue, by refusing to update the old chain, they effectively held their funding and updates hostage to make sure people can't opt out without significant costs [1,2]. Additionally, with such capital, it's trivial to affect the swing vote for under-represented polls with eth or hashpower making their polling governance methods unsecure. Furthermore, once the old chain did receive an exchange and thus possible value, the old chain coins from EF premine were used to damage the value of the old chain further [1].
  3. EF has name recognition as the founders, name ownership of "the real Eth" or ETH, with even a trademark [1]. Unlike volunteer based or anonymous core teams, EF is Swiss nonprofit operating as a single entity. When a high publicity issue appeared that threatened their money, they were able to stop trade on major exchanges with a simple message [1,2].
  4. Exchanges were deceived by the EF into belief there will be no one in dissent of the self-bailout fork (leaving the other fork without a market and 0 worth) and not prepared for people opting out of bailout [1,2,3], which was misleading due to highly uncertain polls (below). This deception allowed them to be the only chain with value following the fork, and allowed them to keep the name. Despite it all, dissent was also to exist by original chain surviving and prospering even under countless harmful actions of the EF (usually 1/3rd of Eth in number of transactions, 45-50% of marketcap at peak [3], and even longer chain on at least one occasion).
EF demonstrated ability and willingness to cease trade, fork, and affect entire network when a single app of their choosing fails while profiting from it [1]. The non-democratic nature of the decision was noted by many [1,2].
Changes in properties of the ether security - securities fraud
The "unstoppable" app was sending money to an unknown user. What followed was the controversial change of the advertised rules where EF stopped the app by censoring that transaction without consent and confiscated the transaction contents resulting in personal profit for EF devs and friends. The rule change that let EF and friends profit financially while harming someone else financially is very plausibly securities fraud [1,2,3,4]. Additionally, it was a clear conflict of interest in governance.
The change of the rules of the security associated platform to censor or run applications based on feelings of how it should run (e.g. liked/ok or disliked/exploit) by the Ethereum Foundation (a centralized entity) broke the EF and DAO earlier statements on decentralization, lack of censorship, and explicit execution of code. While the user followed all the known rules from statements of the platform and the app, the fork rule changes were applied not to fix a bug but to undo previous actions using new rules ex post facto. The changes were retroactive and arbitrary: stopping the app and censoring the user by reverting his money transfer back to where they could take it out, subjectively justified by calling it a theft. Blockchains gain value by decentralizing trust to numerous different parties thus creating censorship resistance against minority attacks and thus security. Ethereum Foundation supported ether asset changed from decentralized, trustless, secure, censorship-resistant platform asset to (proven based on EF actions) centralized, trust-requiring, unsecure, censorable platform asset hence damaging said value. However, to this day the advertisement of the properties of the ether security has not changed, long after EF actions proved virtually every statement in them false. No safeguards were put into place to prevent a repeat as well. This makes it a case of continuous securities fraud as well.
What choice did community have? Bad and worse.
No evidence of community support for bailout
The justifications of the self-bail out forks are often in the tone of it being a democratic decision or that there was agreement from the community. The survival of the original chain both in value and transactions despite being damaged in value by the EF and even when it had no market value is a demonstration it was not an insignificant disagreement. Additionally, often several voluntary polls are referred to with ~5% eth and 12% hash turnout and single digit 4% and 9% vote of all possible votes for self-bail out fork [1,2,3] - far from majority. Historic archives of the subreddit and simple online polls during the time show much stronger opposition to bailout [1,2,3,4,5].
Issues with official poll
  1. The low turnouts of a voluntary insignificant poll done on a little known subreddit instead of protocol level makes it statistically insignificant. EF made carbon vote the "official" vote 12 hours before the release of the client after claiming it had no official capacity and after making support for the EF-bailout fork default option in the code base [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Additionally, due to low turn out and polls could be easily manipulated for financial gain by buying eth or renting hash power momentarily just for the vote by third parties (thus breaking another earlier statement). About 1/4th of the 5% eth vote was from a single voter [1].
  2. Voluntary polls are extremely susceptible to biases. Voluntary response bias strongly favors those with stronger incentives to respond and thus results in sampling bias: the profit coming from self-bailout of a minor third party app investors is far stronger incentive than voting for standard operation of a blockchain. Uncast votes from apathy or not being up to date was prevalent accounting for 90%+ mentioned above. By setting the bailout as the default setting (unlike opt-in setting used typically elsewhere) with only 12 hour warning, anyone not paying attention was tricked into supporting the bailout. Nodes can simply automate "apt-get upgrade && apt-get update" so this setting took advantage of everyone who hasn't seen official announcement only hours earlier [1].
  3. Censorship resistance is often taken for granted in crypto projects as it is expected as the minimum requirement of something being called a blockchain. This expectation results in a bias from bystander effect [1] and diffusion of responsibility to ensure it: many assume vote for censorship resistance is a sure thing but will definitely happen by others voting. What can happen is a group expects someone else to vote and ends up in almost no one voting.
  4. By the EF labeling the unintended execution of a contract "an exploit" and the person doing it "the attacker" alleging "theft" (which was not a universal interpretation) and stating support for the bailout, they introduced leading question bias that increases tendency to vote in a way that favored bailout. Additionally, individuals and companies had to face a social desirability bias where they were more likely to vote in a way that would feel more socially acceptable.
In summary on 2 polls selected and referenced by the EF is that there is no conclusive evidence of majority support for the bailout fork. Similar conclusions were reached by others. [1]
Financial & value attacks
Ethereum Foundation refused to work on the older chain thus damaging the older security they sold [1,2]. Ethereum Foundation took the premine from the development of the original chain, which is possible theft. Ethereum Foundation took the money of a rule following user, which is possible theft [1]. Ethereum Foundation compromised security of the old chain by keeping it open to replay attacks hurting its value further[1]. Ethereum Foundation damaged the value of the competing asset of the original chain using the stolen premine by selling it on exchanges [1] and making fun of doing so [2]. Ethereum Foundation and closely related White Hat Group (WHG) not only took the remaining money from the DAO on their chain, but also on the original chain, and then used the funds to damage the price of the competing asset on the exchanges [1,2,3,4].
Every level of Ethereum proven to be unsecure and not trustworthy
Additionally, every level of ethereum after proven centralized requires trust. And it's easily shown how each level cannot be trusted thus lowering its value:
  1. Code: Ethereum Foundation (EF) via demonstration of centralized control stated and shown that they will decide how code should run instead of as written, so the code itself doesn't matter, and it can't be trusted to handle transactions, balances, apps.
  2. Apps: Ethereum foundation broke the promises of a third party app called DAO that very uniquely stated code sets the terms, so eth apps cannot be trusted.
  3. EF: Ethereum foundation also broke its own advertised statements about the platform when it censored users and stopped apps to take others money for subjective reasons. Additionally, their refusal to acknowledge conflict of interest, making a poll official only hours before pushing the update, and abusing power of defaults in the code shows so Ethereum Foundation cannot be trusted [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Additionally, centralization shown by EF makes it a weak spot for malicious actors to attack the entire platform using incentives (e.g. litigation, force, threat, pressure 1) to force them to exercise the control over the chain once again with existing precedent. There's no way to gain trust that this attack vector won't be used.
The self-bailout fork events demonstrated centralized Ethereum Foundation has complete centralized control over every level of this blockchain: every transaction and every app. It proved that EF has capability and the will to use it to overwrite operation of any smart contract even if it serves their self interest. In other words, Eth is a proven unsecure centralized censorable trust-requiring platform that can't be trusted on any level with any aspect of operation. There are zero safeguards currently in place to prevent EF from taking advantage of their control from occurring again. Additionally this is public information making it a well known centralized weakness and, thus, a known attack vector that could be used by interested third parties, which would be nothing new [1].
Nothing has been done to fix it and continues to be part of Ethereum's flawed premine controlled "economic forks"[1].
This subreddit is a curated collection of resources for education purposes only that would be difficult to find downvoted on biased ethereum subreddits to protect and warn people from being hurt by this fraud via investment or development on top of a nonsecure blockchain.
Other notable events about Ethereum to read about:
SUMMARY: Ethereum is an unsecure, trust-requiring, centralized, mutable platform that runs stoppable apps and censors people Ethereum Foundation (EF) dislikes - the opposite of what it advertises itself as. Ethereum Foundation misrepresents what Ethereum is to prospective investors for increasing the value of the traded asset ETH while profiting financially. This means, by definition, Ethereum Foundation is participating in fraud by continuously misleading investors. Furthermore, the act of suddenly changing the properties of the unregistered security after the sale of the security in the initial coin offering (ICO) and/or on exchanges while profiting personally constitutes securities fraud. Additionally, Ethereum Foundation is connected to damaging the value of sold assets, damaging the value of competing assets, theft from competition, and market manipulation of competing assets for profit.
Nothing has changed after historic actions proved centralization beyond reasonable doubt. Eth is still centralized, unsecure, and gains value only through fraud
submitted by newweeknewacct to ethereumfraud [link] [comments]

OpenLibernet - Take back the Internet

We appreciate the community support around the OpenLibernet project so far. As we said, the theory and the white paper need more work and we appreciate your contributions and suggestions.
To answer some of the questions that we have so far received, here are some notes:
1) To summnarize what OpenLibernet is all about: It is a proposal for a software that combines Mesh Routing with the Bitcoin protocol. An OpenLibernet node (Peer) is typically a wireless router that gets paid for all the traffic it helps route, and pays for all the traffic it generates.
2) The payment system is based on the bitcoin protocol. We do not USE bitcoin per-se, we reproduce the payment system.
3) OpenLibernet traffic could be regarded as an alt-coin; but we propose measures to curb the use of traffic as a currency.
4) The proposed protocol introduces very little novelty to either the bitcoin algorithm or mesh routing. In fact, it is a straight-forward bellman-ford distance vector implementation, that borrows from several mesh networking protocols including Netsukuku, CJDNS and AODV.
5) We will be exploring how we can collaborate with other decentralization projects such as Ethereum and MaidSafe towards establishing a truly decentralized and secure internet.
Website: www.openlibernet.org Blog: http://blog.openlibernet.org email: [email protected]
Again, we thank everyone for their support.
submitted by OpenLibernet to OpenLibernet [link] [comments]

Distance Vector Routing Protocol CS103 - Computer Networking 01 - Distance Vector Routing شبكات الحاسوب 34 Distance Vector Routing Algorithms - YouTube Distance Vector Routing Algorithm with Example  IIT ... Distance vector routing protocol

This protocol is considered an IPV6 distance vector proactive routing protocol. The trickle timer algorithm is one of its major components. This algorithm is used to control and track the control ... Distance vector protocols, such as RIP, looks at how many hops there are in a route, and calculates a metric from that, since fewer hops means faster processing since fewer routers have to forward the packet. This is quite old-school thinking, and dates from a time when routers were slow and bandwidth quite inconsequential. These days routers are quite fast, and the hop-count not that ... Distance Vector. Pure distance vector protocols are rare; the only one really remaining in any sort of use is RIP. EIGRP, a Cisco proprietary protocol, is also technically distance vector, but it makes use of several optimisations that allow it to overcome the traditional shortcomings of distance vector protocols. Distance vector protocols do not distribute any topology information; they ... Distance vector routing protocols are protocols that use distance to work out the best routing path for packets within a network. These protocols measure the distance based on how many hops data has to pass to get to its destination. The number of hops is essentially the number of routers it takes to reach the destination. Each packet contains only the distance vector for that router. When a router receives a packet it is supposed to update it's own distance vector accordingly using the Bellman-Ford algorithm. The problem I'm having is that I am finding myself unable to implement the actual algorithm without cheating and using an adjacency matrix.

[index] [9242] [20339] [15081] [48044] [38595] [22499] [41413] [18526] [49324] [338]

Distance Vector Routing Protocol

A protocol in Dynamic Routing to calculate shortest distance. Briefly explained in cool animation. distance vector routing algorithm example Semester3 تابع كا جديد في موقع درس وكتاب http://www.s2book.com او عبر صفحتنا على الفيس بوك https://www.facebook.com ... A tutorial on the differences of Distance Vector and Link-State routing protocols for the Cisco CCNA http://danscourses.com A distance-vector routing (DVR) protocol requires that a router inform its neighbors of topology changes periodically. Historically known as the old ARPANET rou...